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h i g h l i g h t s
• We consider a two-player all-pay auction in which the designer chooses a head start.
• The designer maximizes a convex combination of the expected total and highest effort.
• Unless the weight on the highest effort is 1, small head starts are worse than none.
• A positive head start is optimal iff the weight on the highest effort is large enough.
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a b s t r a c t
We consider a two-player all-pay auction with symmetric independent private values that are uniformly
distributed. The designer chooses the size of a head start that is given to one of the players. The designer’s
objective is to maximize a convex combination of the expected highest effort and the expected aggregate
effort. Unless the weight on the highest effort is one, small head starts are always worse than no head
start. Moreover, the optimal head start is strictly positive if and only if the weight on the highest effort is
large enough.
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Contests are among the most frequently used mechanisms
with applications in job promotion, procurement, competitions for
grants or college admission, innovation, R&D, sports and so forth.
The organizer of a contest often directly or indirectly benefits from
the effort that participants invest. Hence, natural objectives when
designing a contest are to maximize the expected aggregate effort
or the expected highest effort. The latter objective is, for instance,
particularly relevant in innovation contests where the organizer
plans to implement only the best innovation, e.g., the best of the
prototypes or algorithms that are submitted by the participants.
Another example is a firm that adopts themost creative advertising
campaign out of several proposals.
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: c.seel@maastrichtuniversity.nl (C. Seel),
cedric.wasser@uni-bonn.de (C. Wasser).
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0165-1765/© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.Surprisingly, the contest literature has mainly focused on the
problem of maximizing aggregate effort. A common finding is that
if contestants are asymmetric in their abilities, it is beneficial for
the designer to bias the contest in favor of weaker participants:
leveling the playing field enhances competition and thereby elicits
more effort. However, if contestants are symmetric, the designer
typically prefers an unbiased contest; see, e.g., Lazear and Rosen
(1981), Clark and Riis (2000), Kirkegaard (2012), and Franke et al.
(2014).
In this paper, we examine whether this conclusion remains to
hold if the designer is – either exclusively or at least partially –
interested in maximizing the expected highest effort. We consider
an all-pay auction with two ex ante symmetric players that are
privately informed about their uniformly distributed valuations.
The designer can choose the size of a head start (Konrad, 2002; Seel,
2014; Siegel, 2014) that is granted to one of the players. This player
wins whenever the sum of her effort and the head start is higher
than the other player’s effort. Whereas any nonzero head start
reduces the expected aggregate effort in our setting, we show that
the optimal head start is strictly positive if the expected highest
212 C. Seel, C. Wasser / Economics Letters 124 (2014) 211–214effort is sufficiently important to the designer. Hence, the common
intuition of leveling the playing field does not necessarily apply.
Two recent papers show that unequal treatment of ex ante
symmetric players can be beneficial if the designer is not or not
only interested in the efforts of the contestants. Kawamura and
Moreno de Barreda (2014) find that a head start may increase
the probability of selecting the highest ability player in an all-
pay auction that is played under complete information. Pérez-
Castrillo andWettstein (2013) study innovation contestswhere the
quality of a player’s innovation is a function of his privately known
type and his effort. They show that the designer may profit from
discriminating among contestants by letting the size of the prize
vary with the winner’s identity.
2. Model and preliminaries
There are two players i = 1, 2 competing for a single prize. Each
player i privately knows his valuation for the prize vi, which is a
realization of the random variable Vi. The random variables V1 and
V2 are identically and independently distributed according to the
continuous cumulative distribution function F . They have a strictly
positive density f on their support [0, v̄]. The virtual valuation
function
ψ(v) := v −
1 − F(v)
f (v)
is strictly increasing in v. (1)
Players compete in a first-price all-pay auction. Player 1 enjoys a
head start a ∈ [0, v̄],1 i.e., he wins if b1 + a > b2 and player 2
wins if b1 + a ≤ b2, where bi denotes the bid (invested effort) of
player i. The (ex post) payoff of player i is vi − bi if he wins and −bi
otherwise. A pure strategy for player i is a function βi: [0, v̄] → R+
so that player i bids βi(vi) if his valuation is vi.
From Kirkegaard (2012) it follows that in the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of this game for a given head start a, players use the
equilibrium strategies
βa1(v) :=
0 if v < v̂, v
v̂
x dF(x) if v ≥ v̂,
βa2(v) :=
0 if v < v̂,a +  v
v̂
x dF(x) if v ≥ v̂,
where v̂ is implicitly defined by a = v̂F(v̂).




1 (v) = β
0
2 (v) for
v < v̂ whereas 0 < βa1(v) < β
0
1 (v) = β
0
2 (v) < β
a
2(v) for v > v̂. A
head start for player 1 induces both players to exert zero effort for
low valuations. For high valuations, the head start leads to player
2 bidding more aggressively and player 1 bidding less aggressively
compared to the benchmark without a head start.
The contest designer’s objective is tomaximize a weighted sum
of the expected highest effort and the expected average effort2:
Wγ (a) := γ E[max{βa1(V1), β
a
2(V2)}]








1 We exclude head starts a > v̄ from the analysis to avoid the trivial equilibrium
in which both players always bid zero.
2 Note that maximizingWγ is equivalent to maximizing the weighted sum of the
expected highest effort (weight γ ′) and the expected total effort (weight 1−γ ′) for
γ =
γ ′
2−γ ′ .where γ ∈ [0, 1]. We denote optimal head starts by a∗(γ ) :=
argmaxa Wγ (a).










x dF(x) dF(v). (2)




























where we have used that

ψ(x)f (x)dx = −x(1 − F(x)). Since
a = v̂F(v̂), dv̂da > 0. Together with assumption (1), this implies
W ′0(a) < 0 for all a > 0. Hence, if γ = 0, it is not beneficial to
introduce a head start, i.e., a∗(0) = 0.3
Now, consider γ = 1 such that the objective is the ex-
pected highest effort. To determine W1(a) from the equilib-
rium strategies, observe that from an ex ante perspective, player





. Let Xa :=
max{βa1(V1), β
a
2(V2)} be the highest bid and let Ga denote the cu-































whereas if βa1(v̄) < a < v̄,
Ga(x) =







F(v̂) if x ∈ (0, βa1(v̄)),






if x ∈ [a, βa2(v̄)].
(4)








This expression is significantly less tractable than the expression
for the average effort in (2). For our analysis of optimal head starts
for γ > 0, we will therefore impose a specific distributional as-
sumption.
3. The uniform case
We henceforth assume, in accordance with (1), valuations to be
uniformly distributed on [0, 1], i.e., F(v) = v. This implies v̂ =
√
a
and βa1(v) = β
a






2a for v > v̂. In the following,
we first consider the problem of maximizing the expected highest
effort W1(a). Then we turn to studying optimal head starts that
maximize the general objective functionWγ (a)with γ ∈ [0, 1].
3 For (irregular) type distributions that violate assumption (1), Kirkegaard (2012)
finds that a small head start can be beneficial.
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2a, i.e., a ≤
1
3 . For the uniform




2xa + a2 if x ∈ [0, a),

























































































with the continuous extensionW1(0) = 14 .



































































Using expressions (6) and (7) for the contest designer’s
objectiveW1(a), we obtain the main result of this subsection.
Proposition 1. There is a unique a∗ ∈ (0, 13 ) such that W1(a) is
strictly increasing for all a ∈ [0, a∗) and strictly decreasing for all
a ∈ (a∗, 1].
Proof. First, suppose a ≥ 13 and considerW1(a) given in (7). Notice
that W ′1(a) < 0 for all a ∈ [
1
3 , 1]. Hence, if W1(a) has an internal
maximum, the optimal head start has to satisfy a∗ ∈ (0, 13 ].

















































































































































Consequently, since W ′′′1 (a) < 0, there is a unique ã ∈ (0,
1
3 ) such
that W ′′1 (a) > 0 for a < ã and W
′′
1 (a) < 0 for a > ã. In turn, this
implies that there is a unique a∗ ∈ (ã, 13 ) such that W
′
1(a) > 0 for
a < a∗ andW ′1(a) < 0 for a > a
∗. 
Numerically solving W ′1(a
∗) = 0, we find the expected highest
effort to reach its unique maximum at a∗ ≈ 0.1586. Hence, the
contest designer finds it optimal to provide one player with a head
start which is equal to roughly 13 of the expected valuation (
1
2 ).
Moreover, this leads to v̂ =
√
a ≈ 0.398. Compared with the
benchmark casewhere a = 0, the highest 60% of the types of player
2 increase their bid, while the remaining types of player 2 and all
types of player 1 decrease their bid.
3.2. General objective function
We are now ready to study the problem of maximizing the
general objective function Wγ (a) = γW1(a) + (1 − γ )W0(a).
According to Proposition 1, W1 is first increasing and then
decreasing in a whereas we know from Section 2 that W0 is
decreasing for all a. In the uniform case, the expected average effort










The next proposition shows that for all γ < 1 small head starts
result in a lowerWγ than no head start. However, if the weight on
the highest expected effort is sufficiently large, a large head start
is optimal.
Proposition 2. For all γ ∈ [0, 1), there is an ϵ > 0 such that
Wγ (a) < Wγ (0) for all a ∈ (0, ϵ). Moreover, there is a γ ∈ (0, 1)
such that a∗(γ ) = 0 for all γ ∈ [0, γ ) and a∗(γ ) > 0 for all
γ ∈ (γ , 1].
Proof. Consider γ ∈ [0, 1) and recall that Wγ (a) = γW1(a) +
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2 , we obtain





















































Thus, for all γ ∈ [0, 1), there is an ϵ > 0 such thatWγ (a) < Wγ (0)
for all a ∈ (0, ϵ).
It remains to prove the second statement in the proposition.
Observe that
Wγ (a)− Wγ (0) = γ (W1(a)− W1(0))
+ (1 − γ ) (W0(a)− W0(0)) , (11)
where W0(a) − W0(0) < 0 for all a > 0. Hence, if for a given γ
there is an a such that Wγ (a) > Wγ (0), then Wγ̃ (a) > Wγ̃ (0) for
all γ̃ ≥ γ . Thus, a∗(γ̃ ) > 0 for all γ̃ ≥ γ . Consequently, there is a
γ ∈ [0, 1] such that a∗(γ ) = 0 for all γ < γ and a∗(γ ) > 0 for all
γ > γ . We are left to show that γ ∈ (0, 1).
By Proposition 1, W1(a) > W1(0) for some a > 0. Since
Wγ (a) − Wγ (0) is continuous in γ (see (11)), Wγ (a) > Wγ (0)
for some γ < 1 and hence γ < 1.





2 , we obtain





























3 ) < 0 implies W
′′
γ (a) < 0for all a ∈ [0, 13 ]. In turn, W
′(0) = 0 implies W ′γ (a) < 0 for
all a. Consequently, a∗(γ ) = 0 for all γ ∈ [0, 19 ] and hence γ
> 0. 
According to Proposition 2, there is a critical value γ above
which the designer finds it optimal to introduce a strictly positive
head start. Numerical simulation yields γ ≈ 0.6307. Fig. 1 depicts
the optimal head start as a function of γ , which, in line with the
proposition, is discontinuous at γ .
4. Conclusion
According to conventional wisdom, the main reason for biasing
a contest is to reduce the heterogeneity among contestants in order
to elicit more aggregate effort. We offer a different explanation
for introducing a bias: in an all-pay auction with symmetric
contestants a head start can be beneficial if the designer is (at
least partially) interested in the expected highest effort. Rather
than being a choice variable, the head start could also represent
a (behavioral) bias of a jury in favor of one contestant. In this
interpretation, a biased jury may lead to a higher expected highest
effort than an unbiased jury.
By considering head starts, we have focused on one specific
instrument with which the designer can influence the outcome of
a contest. A promising avenue for future research is to allow for
more general instruments in optimal asymmetric contest design
for maximizing the expected highest effort.
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